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NOTES
ever, the court of appeal, on rehearing, was of the opinion that
the exception of no right of action and no cause of action filed by
the defendant was "more properly an exception of want of ca-
pacity to sue.' 1 2 The Supreme Court, in overturning the court
of appeal's ruling on the exception, properly regarded the excep-
tion as one of no right of action. 1. The real question was not
the plaintiff's capacity to sue but was, in fact, whether she had a
justiciable interest in the property in question.. Plaintiff was
suing to have property acquired during marriage declared her
separate property. There was no allegation that she was suing
for the community, or as agent for her husband as head and
master of the community, nor was there any issue as to her
individual capacity to sue. Therefore, the exception was directed
toward the question of whether she had an interest in having
this property adjudicated to herself. This situation is not to be
confused with the case where a wife purports, as agent for the
community, to sue on a compiunity cause of action. In such a
case, the proper exception might well be one of want of ca-
pacity.14 Pretermitting that question, however, the proper ex.
ception for challenging plaintiff's interest in the property and
determining, whether it was in fact separate or community prop-
erty appears to be that of no right of action. If plaintiff, on
trial of the exception, can adduce sufficient evidence to establish
the property as part of her paraphernal effects, then the e xcep,-
tion should be overruled; if not, it should be sustained.
Richard F. Knight
LOUISIANA PRATICE-E - RES JUDICATA -. M ATT.RkS
WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN PLEADED
Plaintiffs sued to have a probated olographic will declared a
nullity. The controversy had. been before the court on two prior
occasions. In the first suit the will was attacked on the grQund
that the imposition of one numeral over another made the date
uncertain, but it was held that the date was adequate. A second
12. Steens 7. Johnson, 81 So.2d 469 (La. App. 1955). While the opi.ni.on of
the court of appeal is not entirely clear, the court seemed to indicate that, even
accepting defendant's contention that the exception was one of no right of action,
it was not well founded because the record furnished evidence to rebut the pre-
uqmption that the property involved was community property.
13. See note 11 supra.
14. For a discussion of this point, see MC AHoN, LqulsrANA PR4qTiCE 30-31(Supp. 1956).
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suit was dismissed on an exception of no cause of action because
the plaintiff was found to have misconstrued the holding in the
first case. In the present procedings the will was attacked on
the ground that it was physically impossible for the deceased to
have made the will on the date established by the court because
of his absence from the state. The trial court sustained excep-
tions of no right and no cause of action and a plea of res judi-
cata. On appeal, held, exception of res judicata sustained. The
object of all the suits was to establish the invadility of the will
in question, and only the reasons for grounds for its validity are
different. Succession of Reynolds, 231 La. 410, 91 So.2d 584
(1957).
In the principal case the court was again confronted with
the conflict between common law and civilian principles of res
judicata with respect to matters which might have been pleaded
in a previous suit.' The competition of these two concepts within
this area of the law in Louisiana necessitates their separate
treatment.
At common law, the designation of a matter as one adjudged
and not susceptible of re-adjudication may be based on the doc-
trine of res judicata or on the doctrine of estoppel by judgment.
Res judicata, strictly speaking, will not be sustained unless there
is identity of cause of action, of the thing sued for, of parties,
and of the qualities in which they appear.2 Once these requisites
are met, the doctrine of res judicata bars a later demand arising
out of any matter which was or might have been pleaded in a
prior suit on the same cause of action.3 The phrase "cause of
action" has many meanings, but is generally defined as the facts
which establish the existence of a primary right in the plaintiff
and a violation of this right by the defendant.4 A single cause
of action may be based on several grounds, and a plaintiff who
fails to urge all the grounds at his disposal is thereafter pre-
cluded from litigating those omitted as fully as though he had
advanced them, but had failed to introduce evidence in support
1. For a comprehensive treatment of this problem see Comment, Res Judicata-
"Matters Which Might Have Been Pleaded," 2 LoUrSiANA LAW REvIEW 347, 491
(1940).
2. 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS 927 § 610 (1902).
3. 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS 1421-22, § 674 (1925). See 2 id. at 1422-24, § 675,
for certain qualifications to this rule.
4. 2 id. at 1433, § 678. See American Fire and Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S.
6, 13 (1951).
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of them.5 "Under the common law the right to have a deed or
contract set aside is regarded as a single cause of action, while
fraud, incapacity, or undue influence merely constitutes the
grounds for the cause of action."
"A considerable part of the breadth of res judicata in the
common law may be traced to the doctrine of estoppel by judg-
ment."' 7 This doctrine is applied when the cause of action is
different in the two suits, but issues which have been previously
adjudicated are involved.8 The estoppel extends not only to the
issues actually adjudicated but to all matters which might have
been urged in support of or against the issues.9 "Issue," as used
in this connection, is understood quite broadly, i.e., when the
validity of a contract, deed, or similar instrument is in issue,
every matter either of law or fact which can be urged for or
against its validity must be raised in a single suit.10 If a plain-
tiff secures a judgment on a note or contract, its genuineness is
impliedly adjudicated.1 '
The authority of the thing adjudged (res judicata) in French
law is founded on Article 1351 of the French Civil Code.12 The
identity of cause, object, parties, and qualities are required in
every instance. Cause may be defined as "the juridical fact
which constitutes the basis of a right."' 3 For example, suits to
set aside a contract based on different vices would be supported
by different causes although the object of all the suits would be
the same, viz., to set aside the contract. 4 Since there must
5. 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS 1437-40, § 681 (1925). See Comment, 2 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 347, 350 (1940).
6. See note 5 supra.
7. See Comment, 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 347, 351 (1940).
8. 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS 928, § 610 (1902). The identity of the persons and
qualities is necessarily required for the operation of this estoppel, but the identity
of the thing sued for and cause of action are replaced by the single requirement
of identity of issues. See Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322
(1955).
9. 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS 1450-53, § 688 (1925).
10. 2 id. at 1465-68, § 693; 1882-83, § 894.
11. 2 id. at 1884-85, § 895.
12. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1351: "The faith due to res judicata only ex-
tends to what forms part of the judgment. The thing sued for must be the same;
the action must be based on the same cause; the action must be between the same
parties and brought by the same parties against the same parties in the same
capacity."
13. 20 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 80, no 63 (2d ed. 1876).
For a collection of the various definitions of cause by other French commenta-
tors, see Comment, 2 LOUISIANA. LAW REVIEW 347, 355, n. 46 (1940).
14. 3 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRAITA THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
DROIT CIVIL 964-65, no 2681 (1905) ; 8 HUC, COMMENTAIRE TIIEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DU CODE CIVIL nos 303-342 (1895) ; 2 PLANIOL, TRAITlk IULtMENTAIRE DE DROIT
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always be identity of cause and object (things demanded), there
can be no counterpart of the common law estoppel by judgment.
In Louisiana' the doctrine of res judicata rests on Article
2286 of the Civil Code which is taken literally from the French
Code. 16 Aside from the requirements of identity of the thing
sued for, of the parties, and of the qualities in which they ap-
pear, there must be identity of the cause of action. The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court has repeatedly held that this article is stricti
juris and any doubt as to the identity of the causes of action in
two suits must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. 17 For many
years the Louisiana courts alternatively accepted and rejected
the "might have been pleaded" maxim of the common law, with-
out overruling contrary decisions. 8 Then, in the case of Hope v.
Madison 9 the Supreme Court re-examined the jurisprudence on
the subject and announced that in the future, with but three
exceptions,2 O res judicata would not be sustained unless the
CIVIL FRANCAIS 693-94, nos 2189-2190 (1939). See Comment,"2" LOUISIANA L-AW
REVIEW 347, 358-65 (1940). The French differentiate between cause and means,
and if the cause is the same in two suits, a difference in the means will not
suffice to permit a new action to lie. 12 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FaANAIS
450, no 769 (1922); 7 LAROMBIERE, THEORIE ET PRATIQUE DES OBLIGATIONS 163,
no 159 (ed. 1885). Means may be defin.ed as the circuimstances which concur to
constitute a cause, or more restrictively, as proofs or arguments of fact and law
which serve to prove the cause. 3 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRAITt
THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 962-63, no 2680 (2d ed. 1905) ; 20 LAU-
RENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN(AIS 82-84, iro 65 (2d ed. 1876).
15. See Comment, 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 347, 353-365 (1940).
16. FRENCH 'CIVIL CODE art. 1351; LA. CIVIL CODEart. 2286 (1870).
17. Hope v. Madison, 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940) ; McWilliams v. Gulf
States Land & Improvement Co., 111 La. 194, 35 So. 514 (1903) ; State v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902) ; West v. His
Creditors, 3 La. Ann. 529 (1848).
18. E.g., Hope v. Madison, 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1.940) (rejecting the
"might have been pleaded" maxim with three exceptions) ; Buillard v. Davis, 185
La. 255, 169 So. 78 (1936) (holding estoppel by judgment applies in Louisiana)
Exchange Nat. Bank v. Holoman Bros., 177 La. 537, 148 So. 702 (1933) (ac-
cepting the "might have been pleaded" maxim) ; State v. American Sugar Re-
fining Co., 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902) (holding that res judicata will not
be sustained if all the requisites of Article 2286 are not present). See also Wood-
cock v. Baldwin, 110 La. 270, 275, 34 So. 440, 441 (1902) (where it was vaid
that the common law rule of res judicata does not generally obtain in Louisiana).
19. 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940). See McMahon, The 'Work of the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term - Civil Procedure, 16 LouISIANA
LAW REVIEW 361 (1956). See also Comment, 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 347,
491 (1940).
20. The exceptions to the general rule applied in this case and recognized by
courts are : (1) that generally a breach of contract or single tort gives rise to but
one cause of action (but see Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 86, 75 So.2d 14, 17
(1954), where the court treated this as "judicial estoppel") ; (2) that all claims
and defenses must be set up in a petitory action or they will be considered waived;
and (3) that in seeking relief against execution a litigant must set out all the
then existing reasons or grounds. See Himel v. Connely, 195 La. 769, 197 So. 424
(1940), where another was added, viz., that the parties must assert whatever
title they have in suits for partition of property. See also McMahon, The Work
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requisites of Article 2286 were present. The French view as to
cause or cause of action seems to have been adopted, for the
court quoted at length from Planiol and expressly rejected the
"might have been pleaded" maxim of the common law. 21
In the instant case the court purportedly adhered to the civil
law concept of res judicata as manifest in Article 2286 of the
Code, but in fact applied the common law rules. There was no
mention of identity of cause of action, although the court did
state that the test of Article 2286 had been met.22 After stating
that the object of the suits was the same, the court held that
only the reasons for the invalidity of the will were different. 2
In the concurring opinion the view was expressed that although
the cause of action was the same in the suits and only the rea-
sons were different, res judicata would not be available.24 The
concurring Justice stated that the suit should be amenable to
an exception of no cause of action or one of judicial estoppel
since the failure of the plaintiff to assert a known claim would
be considered a waiver of that claim.2 5 In the dissenting opinion
the view was expressed that the plea of res judicata should not
be sustained for the cause of action in each suit was not the
same, and the suit did not fall into one of the three areas in
which, under Hope v. Madison,26 the "might have been pleaded"
maxim obtains in Louisiana.27
It appears that the majority and the concurring opinion have
confused the object of the suit with the civil law concept of cause
of action or cause. At common law the object of the suit in the
instant case would be identical with the cause of action, viz., the
invalidity of the will would be both the object of the suit and the
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1940-1941 Term -Pleading and Prac-
tice, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 363-64 (1941).
21. 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940). In this case Mrs. Hope sued Madison
to set aside a sale of property on the ground that it was made without adequate
consideration. Her demand was rejected and in a second suit she demanded that
the sale be set aside on the ground that it was the sale of a litigious right. The
Supreme Court held that although the parties and the object demanded were
identical, the plea of res judicata could not be sustained because the cause of ac-
tion was not the same.
22. 91 So.2d 584, 587 (La. 1956).
23. Id. at 587-88.
24. Id. at 588.
25. As has been previously pointed out, estoppel by judgment occurs only
when there is no identity of cause of action and object, and the clear language
of Article 2286 should preclude the applicability of this doctrine in Louisiana. See
Comment, 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 347, 503-05 (1940).
26. See note 19 supra.
27. 91 So.2d 584, 588-89 (La. 1956).
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cause of action.28 However, the civilian concept of cause of ac-
tion is much more restricted, and the object of the suit would
not coincide with the cause of action. 29 The allegedly inexact
date in the first suit, the grounds for the allegation that de-
ceased died intestate in the second suit, and the allegation that
deceased could not have possibly signed the will due to his ab-
sence from the state in the present suit would constitute dif-
ferent causes under the civil law. 0 Therefore, invalidity of the
will would have been only the object of the suit and nothing
more.
It is suggested that the civil law concepts of cause of action
and res judicata should preclude the general applicability of the
"might have been pleaded" maxim in Louisiana. Although public
policy requires that litigation have an end, res judicata should
not be applied unless there is present a thing adjudged, accord-
ing to the requisites of Article 2286. Furthermore, the holding in
the instant case appears to undo much of the good work of Hope
v. Madison and the several cases following it.31 It is suggested
that an adherence to the civilian concepts of cause of action and
res judicata as expressed in the above case and the dissent in the
present case would alleviate the confusion resulting from the co-
existence of two discordant lines of authority.
Burrell J. Carter
SALES - AUTOMOBILES - BONA FIDE PURCHASER DOCTRINE
Plaintiff, an Alabama automobile dealer, agreed to sell an
automobile to a Louisiana used car dealer for cash on delivery.
Plaintiff's agent was instructed to deliver the car to New Or-
leans and to accept only cash in payment. When the agent de-
livered the car, however, he accepted a draft. The agent returned
to Alabama and delivered the draft to plaintiff who made no
effort to annul the sale or to secure the return of the car, but
kept the draft for several days and then deposited it for collec-
tion. In the meantime, the used car dealer sold the automobile to
defendant, a good faith purchaser. The draft was dishonored,
28. See note 4 supra.
29. Hope v. Madison, 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940). See note 14 8upra.
See also Comment, 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 347, 491 (1940).
30. See note 29 supra. They would, however, be reasons according to the com-
mon law concept of cause of action.
31. E.g., Leadman v. First Nat. Bank, 198 La. 466, 3 So.2d 739 (1941)
Lloveras v. Reichert, 197 La. 49, 200 So. 817 (1941).
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